Monday, April 20, 2026

The Inevitable Evolution of the Library and What It Might Mean for the Choices Librarians Will Face

Last week Library 2.0 hosted a webinar on "invisible labor" in libraries (very well presented by Sonya Schryer Norris) — the work that librarians do that isn't in their job descriptions, isn't reflected in their compensation, and largely isn't acknowledged by the institutions they serve and that fund them. It was a thoughtful and somewhat sobering presentation, and it stayed with me afterward.

It made me want to apply a framework I've been developing — one I call idealized narratives and actual functions — to the history of public libraries over the last thirty years, and see if it illuminates anything useful about where the profession has been and where it might be heading.

I want to be clear about what this is and isn't. It isn't a critique of librarians, who are by and large among the most dedicated and genuinely caring professionals I've encountered in twenty-plus years of working with them through Library 2.0. It's an attempt to map something honestly, in the hope that the map is more useful than a more comfortable picture would be.


The Framework

Every institution carries two layers that are worth distinguishing.

The first is the idealized narrative — the story the institution tells about why it exists and what it does for people. Schools educate children. Hospitals heal the sick. Courts deliver justice. These narratives are not lies exactly. They describe something real and something genuinely valued. They attract people into the work and sustain their commitment to it.

The second is the actual functions — what the institution actually does that keeps it alive, what its participants genuinely depend on it for, why it persists even when the idealized narrative is being challenged. Schools provide childcare, credentialing, and social sorting. Hospitals are organized around billing codes and liability management. Courts process plea bargains. The actual functions aren't cynical substitutes for the idealized narrative. They're the real work the institution performs, and they serve genuine human needs — even when they're rarely named as such.

The gap between these two layers is not corruption. It's the basic architecture of how institutions function. And it becomes analytically useful when a technology arrives that challenges one or both layers.

There are essentially four possible scenarios when a technology disrupts an industry. The technology can challenge the idealized narrative but leave the actual functions intact — in which case the institution absorbs the technology, narrates it as innovation, and continues. It can challenge both the idealized narrative and the actual functions — in which case the institution faces genuine existential pressure. It can leave the idealized narrative untouched while quietly undermining the actual functions — a kind of silent disruption where the story still sounds credible while the floor drops out. Or it can challenge neither, leaving the institution essentially unchanged.

Which scenario applies determines almost everything about what happens next. And the library's story over the last thirty years is, I think, a revealing case study in how this plays out in practice.

It's also worth saying at the outset that this pattern is not unique to libraries. Skilled, respected professions have faced this dynamic before, and the experience of navigating it is part of a longer human story about what happens when technology moves the ground beneath genuine expertise. I've included an appendix at the end of this essay with several historical examples, for readers who want the broader context.


What the Internet Did

The idealized narrative of the public library is one of the more beautiful ones in American civic life. Free, equitable access to information and knowledge for all citizens. A democratic institution that says: regardless of your income or your background, the accumulated knowledge of civilization is available to you, staffed by professionals trained to help you navigate it, open to everyone.

That narrative drew people into the profession for generations. It still does.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, the internet began dismantling the primary actual function that had sustained the public library: the management of physical information scarcity. The library had the books, the databases, the periodicals, the professional expertise to navigate them. You came to the library because that's where the information was.

The internet didn't make libraries disappear. But it removed the information scarcity function that had been the institution's primary justification. And what happened next is worth examining carefully.

Libraries didn't contract. They expanded — into computer access, into meeting spaces, into community programming, into social services navigation. Each expansion was narrated as a natural extension of the mission. And each one was genuinely responsive to community need.

But it's worth asking an honest question about some of those expansions. Makerspaces, for instance, became a significant trend in school and public libraries through the 2010s. They're creative, they're engaging, they provide hands-on learning opportunities. Many librarians embraced them with genuine enthusiasm, and that enthusiasm was real.

At the same time, makerspaces are more naturally a vocational education function than an information access function. The honest observation isn't that makerspaces were wrong. It's that the library was the available institution — present, funded, staffed by people constitutionally inclined to say yes — rather than necessarily the right institution for that particular function. The pattern of reaching for adjacent activities when the core function erodes is worth noticing, because it has continued, at greater cost, in the years since.


Where Things Stand Now

Here is the most direct way I can describe what I observe in the library community today, drawing on some years now of organizing professional development for librarians and paying close attention to what they tell us they need.

Our most popular programming at Library 2.0 (after AI right now) is not about information literacy. It's not about collection development or community engagement. Our most in-demand offering has been "Dealing with Difficult Patrons," part of an extensive body of work around library safety and security developed by Dr. Steve Albrecht. We have also added a mental health and wellness programming track with Loida Garcia-Febo because the demand was there.

We didn't create these offerings speculatively. We followed what the audience was asking for. And what the audience is asking for tells you something that the idealized narrative doesn't.

Librarians are increasingly reporting that they don't feel safe. They are managing mental health crises, addiction, homelessness, behavioral situations, and even sometimes violence, for which their training did not prepare them and for which their institutions have a hard time providing adequate support. The invisible labor conversation from last week is really a conversation about this: the actual functions of the public library have expanded well beyond the idealized narrative, without corresponding expansions in funding, staffing, training, or compensation.

The funding gap is worth naming specifically, because it sits at the center of the difficulty. Libraries are not perceived by funding bodies as the appropriate institutional home for social services. Mental health systems, social services agencies, and public health departments are. But those systems are overwhelmed, and the library — open to everyone, staffed by caring professionals, physically present in communities — often quietly absorbs the overflow. The functions arrived without the funding that should accompany them, and there is no obvious political mechanism by which that funding will follow.

There is also something worth naming about the professional culture itself, and I say this with genuine appreciation rather than judgment. Librarians are caring people. A significant portion of the profession holds values oriented toward service, inclusion, and advocacy for the vulnerable. Those values are real and they produce real good. But they also make institutional boundary-setting genuinely difficult. The same orientation that makes librarians exceptional at their work makes it hard to say: this function belongs elsewhere, and absorbing it without resources is not serving either library patrons, libraries, or library staff. Within the professional culture, that kind of boundary-setting can feel like abandoning the mission. The result is a profession that keeps saying yes to functions it cannot adequately resource, sustained by an idealized narrative that doesn't fully account for what the work has become.

The consequences are visible. Compassion fatigue is a recurring theme in library conversations. Attrition is increasing. The gap between what people imagined the profession would be and what it looks like on any ordinary day has widened considerably.


What AI Does to This Picture

The internet challenged the library's idealized narrative while leaving some significant actual functions intact. Reference expertise, information navigation, the professional mediation of complex research questions — these survived the internet era as genuine differentiators. A trained librarian navigating specialized databases, evaluating sources, and guiding a patron through a difficult research question was doing something Google couldn't fully replicate.

AI challenges those remaining functions directly.

The reference interview — understanding what a patron actually needs, translating a vague question into a productive search, evaluating the quality and relevance of results — is very close to what a well-used language model does. Not perfectly, and not without limitations, but well enough for the majority of reference interactions, which are not complex research questions but relatively routine navigation tasks. And AI is only going to get better. Maybe dramatically.

It's also worth being honest about something the profession's idealized narrative has tended to overstate. Librarians have championed information literacy as a professional value and a public mission for decades. That commitment is genuine. But the reach of that expertise beyond the profession's own community has been limited for some time. The audience for information literacy training has been largely other librarians, library school faculty, and professional conference attendees. The general public has not become demonstrably more information literate as a result of library programming. This isn't a failure of effort or intention — it's a structural observation about where the expertise has actually landed.

The deeper issue is that the cultural conditions which would reward careful, critical thinking about information are not currently being cultivated by the broader environment. The attention economy is optimized for fast, confident, frictionless information consumption. AI adoption is being driven by the same logic. The librarian's instinct to slow down and evaluate — which is genuinely valuable and genuinely rare — is structurally at odds with how information is being produced, distributed, and monetized at scale. The expertise doesn't lose because it's wrong. It loses because it's slow in a fast system, careful in a careless one, and the business model of the attention economy depends on people not doing it. There is a tragic irony here — the moment when careful evaluation of information arguably matters most is arriving precisely as the institutional structures that housed that expertise are under their greatest pressure.

This places the library firmly in the second scenario of the framework: the technology challenges both the idealized narrative and the actual functions, and leaves the institution without a strong layer underneath to hold it up. What remains — the social services absorption, the safety management, the community anchor function — arrived by default rather than by design, without funding or cultural mandate, and without the kind of public recognition that would sustain political support for library budgets.

That is a genuinely difficult position. And it's one that, in my observation, the profession has not yet found a clear way to talk about.


The Three Paths

None of this is a verdict on individual librarians, who are navigating real choices in real institutions with real constraints. The institutional trajectory and the personal trajectory are different things, and it's worth separating them.

Looking at the library community as honestly as I can, I see three paths emerging.

The first path is staying and championing the evolution toward community services. Some librarians are genuinely suited to and fulfilled by the expanded mission — the human contact, the social services navigation, the role of community anchor. They find meaning in the work even as it changes, and they are not wrong to. The community need is real. The question for people on this path is whether they can go into it with clear eyes about the funding reality, the compassion fatigue risk, and the gap between what the institution is being asked to do and what it is being resourced to do. Sustained by an honest assessment rather than an idealized narrative, this path is viable and valuable. Sustained by the fiction that the resources and recognition will eventually arrive, it carries significant personal cost.

The second path is staying and fighting for the critical information function — the expertise in source evaluation, research navigation, and information literacy that the profession was trained to provide. This is a genuine fight, and the expertise being defended is real. But the honest observation is that the institutional battle for this function within the public library is probably not one that will be won, at least not at scale, in the current cultural and funding environment. Where this expertise has a more promising future is in adjacent spaces that are actively looking for it: health systems navigating AI-generated medical information, corporate settings grappling with information quality, educational institutions that are actively trying to prepare students for an AI-mediated information environment, and policy contexts where careful evaluation of AI outputs is genuinely valued. The expertise is worth carrying. The public library may not be the institution that allows it to flourish.

The third path is moving on — leaving the library for settings where the training and values translate into work that feels more aligned with what drew people into the profession in the first place. This is not abandonment. It is a reasonable response to an honest assessment of where the institution is heading and what the individual needs in order to do good work sustainably. The people who make this choice would not, in my view, be failing the profession. They are exercising the self-knowledge that the profession's own idealized narrative sometimes makes difficult to claim.


What Deserves to Survive

Institutions are not the same as the people inside them, or the values they carry, or the expertise they've developed.

The public library as an institution is under genuine pressure, and the trajectory I've described here doesn't resolve itself easily. The funding gap between what libraries are being asked to do and what they are being resourced to do is structural, not incidental. The cultural conditions that would elevate and reward careful, critical information expertise are not currently strengthening. The profession is navigating a transformation that arrived without a roadmap and without adequate support.

But the people who went into library work because they believed that careful thinking about information mattered, that equitable access to knowledge was worth defending, that the vulnerable deserved patient and competent help navigating complex systems — those people are carrying something worth carrying. That expertise and those values have a future. It may not be inside the institution as it currently exists. But it exists.

The most useful thing I can offer, after twenty years of watching this community, is simply the honest map. Not because the map is encouraging in every direction, but because people who know what they're looking at can make better choices.

The invisible labor webinar from Sonya was, in a way, an early version of that honest map. The profession is naming what it has actually been doing. I think that has value.


Appendix: This Has Happened Before

The pattern described in this essay — a skilled, respected profession finding that technology dissolved the specific function that made its expertise valuable — is not new, and it is not unique to libraries. The following examples, researched and written by Claude.ai, are offered not as context. Understanding that this dynamic recurs across very different fields, affecting professionals who were genuinely skilled and genuinely committed, makes it easier to see the structural forces at work rather than looking for failures of individual effort or institutional will.


Typographers and Compositors

For centuries, the craft of typesetting — arranging type for print — required years of apprenticeship, genuine expertise in typography, layout, spacing, and print quality. Compositors knew things about how text worked on a page that writers and editors did not, and that expertise was respected and well-compensated.

Desktop publishing, arriving in the mid-1980s with the Macintosh and programs like PageMaker, moved the typesetting function to the person generating the content. It didn't augment compositors — it made their specific function unnecessary by relocating it. The expertise was real. The cultural moment when it might have been most valued — the explosion of desktop-published material that was typographically poor precisely because the craft knowledge had been discarded — arrived just as the profession was being dismantled. What survived was a smaller, higher-specialized tier of typographic designers working at a level where the craft still commanded a premium.

The parallel to libraries is close: caring professionals with genuine craft expertise, a technology that moved the function rather than improving it, and a cultural moment where the expertise arguably mattered more than ever arriving at the same time as the institutional disruption.


Accountants and Bookkeepers

Before the spreadsheet, a significant layer of the accounting profession existed specifically to manage the labor of numerical calculation and ledger maintenance. This wasn't clerical work — it required training, accuracy, professional judgment, and deep familiarity with financial records and their relationships. The expertise was real and the function was genuinely essential.

VisiCalc, released in 1979, and later Lotus 1-2-3, dissolved the calculation and ledger function almost immediately. What remained — tax judgment, financial strategy, audit, complex analysis, regulatory compliance — was genuinely more skilled work. But the middle layer, the professionals whose expertise was primarily in accurate calculation and ledger management, found their specific function gone. The profession restructured around what the spreadsheet couldn't do, and shed a substantial portion of its workforce in the process.

The lesson is not that accounting disappeared. It's that the technology didn't augment the existing profession uniformly — it eliminated specific functions and left others intact, and the people whose expertise was concentrated in the eliminated functions faced a genuine reckoning about where their skills translated.


Telephone Operators

Perhaps the cleanest historical example. Telephone operators were skilled, professionally organized, and genuinely essential — routing calls through complex manual switchboards required training, spatial reasoning, memory, and the ability to manage multiple simultaneous demands under pressure. At their peak in the mid-twentieth century, telephone operating was one of the largest skilled female employment categories in the United States.

Automated switching didn't make operators faster or more productive. It made their specific function unnecessary entirely. The transition happened over decades rather than years, which provided some cushion, but the endpoint was the same: a profession that had been essential found that the technology had moved the function, not improved it.

What makes this example useful is its clarity. There was no ambiguity about the expertise being real. There was no argument that operators were doing their jobs poorly. The function they performed was simply no longer a function that required a human.


Legal Stenographers and Court Reporters

A smaller but precise contemporary example, and one that is still unfolding. Court reporters are skilled, certified professionals whose expertise in stenographic transcription and the official legal record is both genuine and legally mandated. The idealized narrative of the certified official record remains intact and culturally credible.

Voice recognition and AI transcription are dissolving the actual function — accurate real-time transcription of spoken proceedings — while the legal and professional frameworks that protect the certified record are slowing the transition. The profession is fighting on accuracy and certification grounds, which is exactly the institutional resistance the framework would predict. The outcome is not yet settled, but the direction of travel is clear, and it follows the same pattern: genuine expertise, a technology that performs the core function adequately enough for most contexts, and a profession defending its idealized narrative while the actual function erodes.


Radiologists

The most instructive contemporary parallel for a professional audience, because it involves a high-status, highly credentialed profession in the middle of this transition right now.

The idealized narrative of radiology — expert medical interpretation, years of specialized training, the irreplaceable judgment of an experienced physician reading complex imaging — remains fully intact and culturally credible. Radiologists are respected, well-compensated, and central to medical practice.

AI diagnostic tools are already matching or exceeding radiologist accuracy on specific imaging tasks, particularly in pattern recognition for conditions like certain cancers, diabetic retinopathy, and pneumonia detection. The actual function — the expert interpretation of medical images — is being quietly undermined while the idealized narrative remains strong and the legal and institutional frameworks still protect the role.

The profession is responding in the ways the framework predicts: emphasizing the complexity of judgment that AI cannot replicate, the importance of the physician relationship, the cases where AI fails. These arguments are not wrong — they describe real aspects of the work. But they concentrate on the top of the expertise distribution while the middle is being compressed. The radiologists whose work involves the most routine pattern recognition face a different future than those working at the frontier of complex diagnostic judgment.

Radiology is an early and high-visibility example of what may become a broader pattern in professional services: the idealized narrative of expert judgment holds, the legal and institutional protections hold, but the actual function is being performed increasingly by AI, and the profession is restructuring around what remains.


Travel Agents

A more familiar example, and one that has already completed its arc. The idealized narrative of the professional travel agent — expert knowledge of destinations, relationships with hotels and airlines, the ability to construct complex itineraries that a layperson couldn't navigate — was credible and the expertise was real.

The internet didn't improve travel agents. It bypassed them by giving consumers direct access to the booking systems and fare information that had previously required a professional intermediary. The actual function — access to information and booking infrastructure that the public couldn't reach directly — dissolved almost completely. What remained was a smaller tier of high-end travel specialists serving clients for whom the complexity of the itinerary or the value of the relationship justified the fee.

The travel agent example is instructive because it completed quickly and completely enough that the outcome is clear. The profession didn't disappear — it contracted to a specialized tier and restructured around the functions that direct consumer access couldn't replace. The people who survived were those whose expertise was concentrated in judgment and relationship rather than information access.


These examples share a common structure. In each case, the expertise was real. In each case, the technology didn't simply augment the professional — it moved or eliminated a specific function that the professional had been trained to perform. In each case, the profession responded by emphasizing the idealized narrative of expertise and judgment while the actual function eroded beneath it. And in each case, the outcome for individual professionals depended heavily on whether their specific expertise was concentrated in the function the technology eliminated or in the functions that remained.

That structure is what makes these examples relevant to the library situation. Not as a prediction of exactly how things will unfold, but as a reminder that this dynamic has a shape — and that understanding the shape is more useful than being surprised by it.

Understanding the Human Condition 4: "The Enemy Who Completes Us"

Across the human record, the inclusion of an adversary in group identity narratives is so consistent that the exceptions are themselves instructive. The Hebrew Bible defines a people through Egypt, Amalek, Philistia, and Babylon. Greek identity crystallized against Persia in Herodotus. Roman identity required Carthage so completely that Cato closed every speech with Carthago delenda est. Norse cosmology runs on Aesir against the Jotnar. Vedic literature opposes devas and asuras. Zoroastrianism gives perhaps the most architecturally pure version, an entire metaphysics built on Ahura Mazda against Angra Mainyu. Aztec cosmology required perpetual cosmic war. The Iroquois Confederacy formed against external pressure and remembered itself through the Huron. Confucian China oriented around the hua-yi distinction, civilized against barbarian. Mainstream Sunni and Shia traditions each carry the other inside as constitutive. Modern nationalisms cannot be told without the neighbor against whom they consolidated. Marxism requires the bourgeoisie. Fascism requires the Jew, the Bolshevik, the decadent. Liberal democracy required first fascism, then communism, then terrorism, and now whichever populism is named that week. Corporate identity follows the same pattern, Coke against Pepsi, Apple against Microsoft, Boeing against Airbus. Sports rivalries become civic identity. Academic schools constitute themselves against opposed schools. The cases where you have to look hardest for the adversary, certain strands of Buddhism, Bahá'í, some Quaker meetings, turn out on inspection to carry the world or worldliness or war or hierarchy as the constitutive other.

What happens when the adversary disappears is not a return to positive values. It is the rapid generation of internal adversaries. The post-Cold War United States is the cleanest modern test case. The triumphalism of 1991 gave way within a decade to a search for new enemies, the war on terror filling the role briefly, but the deeper pattern was the inward turn that produced what we now call the culture wars, with each tribe inside the country reconstituting the other tribe as existential threat. Post-apartheid South Africa lost the unifying enemy of white minority rule and watched the ANC fragment, internal corruption metastasize, and xenophobic violence against other Africans surface with a speed that surprised observers who expected reconciliation to settle into stable positive identity. The Catholic Church after Constantine, having gone in three centuries from persecuted minority to imperial religion, immediately exploded into Arianism, Donatism, Nestorianism, Monophysitism, the great Christological controversies that consumed the next several centuries. Christianity needed enemies and, lacking them externally, generated them internally with extraordinary creativity. The French Revolution, having defeated the monarchy, turned in within five years to consume Girondins, then Hébertists, then Dantonists, then Robespierre himself. The Bolsheviks, having defeated the Whites, spent the next twenty years finding kulaks, wreckers, Trotskyists, cosmopolitans, doctors. The Chinese Communists after 1949 produced the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution, each requiring fresh enemies. The Iranian Revolution turned within months on its leftist allies. The temperance movement, having achieved Prohibition, simply collapsed, having no further reason to exist. The anti-slavery societies dissolved after abolition. The suffrage movement fragmented after 1920.

The speed at which internal enemies emerge is the part most people underestimate. It is often not years but months, and in some cases the internal enemy is being generated even before the external one is fully defeated. The Bolsheviks were factionalizing during the civil war. The early Christians were producing Marcionites and Montanists while still being fed to lions. The form the internal enemy takes is fairly stable across cultures. Most often it is doctrinal deviance, named as heresy in religious idiom and as revisionism, deviationism, or counter-revolutionary tendency in political idiom. Second is insufficient commitment, the lukewarm, the fence-sitter, the Laodicean, the fellow traveler whose loyalty is not pure enough. Third is pollution or impurity, sometimes racial, sometimes sexual, sometimes ideological, the contaminating element that must be cleansed. Fourth is bad faith, the collaborator, the secret enemy, the one whose outward conformity hides inner betrayal. Fifth is generational, the children of the revolution who are betraying it, or the old guard who are obstructing it. These categories are the same whether the group is the Donatist church in fourth-century North Africa, the Soviet Communist Party in 1937, the Maoist Red Guards in 1966, or a contemporary online ideological community in 2024.

Successful leaders, examined across the record, maintain or generate external threats with a consistency that approaches a structural requirement of the role. Augustus narrated his rule as defense against barbarians and chaos. Napoleon required continuous war, much of it defensible as response to coalitions against him, but the structural need is visible regardless. Lincoln had a genuine adversary, which is precisely why he serves as the comparison case for leaders who manufactured theirs. Hitler theorized the requirement explicitly, as did his jurist Carl Schmitt, who made the friend-enemy distinction the constitutive moment of the political. Stalin produced enemies on a five-year cycle. Mao made enemy-production a permanent campaign infrastructure. The Castro government held together for sixty years substantially through the American blockade as identity stabilizer. The Kim dynasty exists at this point primarily as a function of the threat narrative around it. Erdoğan rotated through enemies, military, Gülenists, Kurds, depending on which destabilization served. Putin moved from oligarchs to NATO to fifth columnists. The pattern holds at the scale of the corporation as well, where the burning platform speech and the designated competitor are foundational tools of CEO leadership. The narration is almost always defensive. We did not seek this conflict, they leave us no choice, this is about justice or values or survival. The function is cohesion maintenance, attention direction, dissent suppression, and legitimation of authority that would otherwise have to justify itself on positive grounds. The gap between narration and function is itself one of the most reliable signals.

Coalitional psychology predicts all of this with uncomfortable precision. The deep evolutionary claim, developed in different forms by Tooby and Cosmides, by Boyer, by Bowles, by Wrangham, is that humans are an obligately coalitional species whose Pleistocene survival depended on group membership and whose cognitive architecture includes specialized machinery for tracking coalition markers, detecting defection, punishing free riders, and orienting toward out-group threat. Choi and Bowles modeled the joint evolution of in-group altruism and out-group hostility and found that neither stably evolves without the other. Terror management research finds that mortality salience reliably increases in-group cohesion and out-group derogation. The prediction is that groups should require an other to function, that the loss of an external other should produce coalition fission and internal enemy generation, that costly signals of commitment should be required to maintain membership, and that the policing of these signals should intensify in proportion to the absence of external threat. The historical record does not just confirm these predictions, it confirms them at a level of consistency that is itself a finding. Cultures with no contact with each other, separated by oceans and millennia, produce the same patterns.

The strongest counterexample, examined honestly, fails. The candidates are real and worth taking seriously. Quakers maintain a peace testimony and equality witness, but Quaker history includes the Hicksite split, the Orthodox-Gurneyite split, the Conservative-Liberal divisions, and a constitutive opposition to war, hierarchy, and established religion that functions as a structural other. Bahá'í explicitly emphasizes unity and inclusion, but the faith has been stabilized in part by persecution in Iran and opposition from Islamic authorities, and where this external pressure is absent the community shows the more ordinary fragmentation patterns. Mennonites and Amish maintain positive community values to a remarkable degree, but their separation from the world makes the world itself the adversary, and the boundary work required to maintain that separation is the central social activity. Effective Altruism tried explicitly to organize around positive values, calculation, and impact, and fragmented within a decade through internal factional warfare, the FTX collapse, and the AI safety versus global health split. Intentional communities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Brook Farm, Oneida, the kibbutzim in their socialist phase, the Bruderhof, generally last one to three generations before either fragmenting, secularizing, or, in the rarer stable cases, intensifying their boundary against the world. Scientific institutions claim to organize around truth-seeking but exhibit the standard coalitional dynamics, school against school, methodology against methodology, the policing of credential and commitment, and the maintenance of clear adversaries from creationists to anti-vaxxers to the previous paradigm. The Olympic movement narrates internationalism but is engineered around national rivalry. The Red Cross is a positive-values institution that exists because of war and disaster. Even small kinship-based societies, where one might expect mutual dependence to suffice for cohesion, turn out in the ethnographic record to be embedded in raid and feud relations with neighboring groups.

The honest summary is that no group of any meaningful size has demonstrated cohesion around positive values alone, sustained across generations, in the absence of either an external adversary or the structural use of an internal one. The cases that come closest either turn out on inspection to carry an adversary in less obvious form, or fragment within a generation or two, or remain small enough that they have not yet been tested by the conditions that reveal the pattern. This is what coalitional psychology predicts. The fact that the prediction is so well confirmed is itself the finding the framework is built to register.